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Background. There are limited data about the coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19)-related organisational responses and the challenges of 
expanding a critical care service in a resource-limited setting. 
Objectives. To describe the ICU organisational response to the pandemic and the main outcomes of the intensive care service of a large state 
teaching hospital in South Africa.
Methods. Data were extracted from administrative records and a prospective patient database with ethical approval. An ICU expansion plan 
was developed, and resource constraints identified. A triage tool was distributed to referring wards and hospitals. Intensive care was reserved for 
patients who required invasive mechanical ventilation (IMV). The total number of ICU beds was increased from 25 to 54 at peak periods, with 
additional non-COVID ICU capacity required during the second wave. The availability of nursing staff was the main factor limiting expansion. 
A ward-based high flow nasal oxygen (HFNO) service reduced the need for ICU admission of patients who failed conventional oxygen therapy. 
A team was established to intubate and transfer patients requiring ICU admission but was only available for the first wave. 
Results. We admitted 461 COVID-19 patients to the ICU over a 13-month period from 5 April 2020 to 5 May 2021 spanning two waves of admissions. 
The median age was 50 years and duration of ICU stay was 9 days. More than a third of the patients (35%; n=161) survived to hospital discharge. 
Conclusions. Pre-planning, leadership, teamwork, flexibility and good communication were essential elements for an effective response. 
A  shortage of nurses was the main constraint on ICU expansion. HFNO may have reduced the requirement for ICU admission, but patients 
intubated after failing HFNO had a poor prognosis.
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Contributions of the study. We describe the organisational requirements to successfully expand critical care facilities and strategies to reduce the 
need for invasive mechanical ventilation in COVID-19 pneumonia. We also present the intensive care outcomes of these patients in a resource-
constrained environment. 
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The COVID-19 pandemic presents an unprecedented challenge to 
intensive care units (ICUs) around the world. Unlike a mass casualty 
event, the pandemic requires a medium- to long-term dynamic 
reorganisation of intensive care services to optimise clinical care in the 
face of a massive clinical burden. Although guidelines for organising an 
ICU response to COVID-19 are available,[1] the response in a country 
with limited ICU resources will, of necessity, be different. 
The Division of Critical Care at Groote Schuur hospital (GSH), the 
main academic hospital of the University of Cape Town, normally 
manages 25 ICU beds spread over the medical, surgical, cardiothoracic 
and source isolation ICU. Neurosurgical and cardiology ICUs are 
managed by their base specialities. Under normal conditions, there 
is a high demand for beds, and not all patients requiring intensive 
care can be admitted. The nurse-to-patient ratio is 1:2 and finding 
enough nurses to staff the units is a constant challenge. Medical staff 
comprises five critical care specialists, four pulmonologists, two to four 
fellows in critical care or pulmonology, a junior anaesthesiologist and 
approximately 12 rotating registrars. Eight critical care technologists and 
two assistant critical care technicians are responsible for ICU and theatre 
equipment and assist with in-hospital patient transport. 
Methods
Hospital administrative records including bed occupancy rates, minutes 
of planning meetings, and internal communications were used to 
corroborate the experiences of the authors. Ethical approval to analyse 
anonymised clinical data from registered patient databases was obtained 
from the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Health 
Sciences at the University of Cape Town (ref. no. HREC 244/2021).
Results
Managerial response and the planning phase
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared a global pandemic on 
5 January 2020. Planning for a surge in hospital patients was initiated 
by the National and Western Cape Departments of Health in February 
2020. The Western Cape Provincial Critical Care Forum made several 
recommendations. An objective ICU triage tool (http://www.sajcc.org.
za/public/sup/503.pdf) based on recommendations by the Critical Care 
Society of Southern Africa[2] was adopted and distributed to all emergency 
centres and COVID wards and referral hospitals.[3] This included a link to 
the Association of Palliative Care Practitioners guidelines for managing 
palliative care during the COVID-19 pandemic.[4] Transport of critically 
ill patients would be minimised because constraints on the ambulance 
service and transferring hypoxic patients on near 100% oxygen is not 
feasible. A  service level agreement was created to allow the transfer of 
appropriately triaged patients at public facilities to private hospitals, to be 
cared for at state expense, if no other option could be accessed.[5]
The GSH plan designated specific wards, overseen by the department 
of medicine, for the care of hospitalised COVID-19 patients. The ward-
based service eventually expanded to 11 wards, managed by 95 doctors 
from various disciplines.[6] 
The ICUs were designated ‘COVID’ or ‘non-COVID’ and reserved for 
patients requiring invasive mechanical ventilation (IMV). On 28 February 
2020, the ICU consultants developed a plan to expand ICU resources. 
Clinical areas in the hospital were surveyed to determine how many 
bed spaces had the minimum support services for an ICU bed. These 
were: two oxygen points, two suction points and 14 electrical sockets. 
A total of 60 bed spaces were identified. Approximately 60  ventilators 
capable of supporting severe acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), 
including loaned and ‘mothballed’ machines, were available. Shortages 
of infusion pumps, monitors and ICU beds were identified. The 
hospital pharmacy stockpiled essential medication. The department of 
anaesthesia established a team to intubate ward patients and transfer 
them to the ICU.[7]
Because COVID-19 ARDS is a complex illness, we aimed not to 
compromise on the quality of intensive care we would provide. The 
limit of ICU patients we could support was determined primarily by the 
availability of ICU staff, particularly nursing staff. Redeployment of staff 
was a necessity.
Initially, some clinical departments resisted the idea of becoming 
involved in the clinical management of what was seen as a predominantly 
medical and ICU condition. On 12 March 2020, the hospital’s chief 
executive officer issued a hospital notice calling for a concerted effort 
from all staff: ‘As health professionals and health support staff, we will 
aim to ensure that we continue to provide a public health service to 
our patients and that we support one another in doing so. Our hospital 
motto of ‘Servamus’ (we serve) and our behavioural principle of ‘I will 
respect you and you will respect me’ continue to guide us in our efforts.’ 
Heads of departments led by example and became directly involved in 
the ward care of COVID-19 patients. 
The first wave
The first COVID-19 ICU patient, a member of the hospital staff, 
was admitted on 5 April 2020. Fortunately, the national state of 
disaster declared on 15 March 2020 (which initially included the 
banning of alcohol sales and a night curfew) drastically reduced trauma 
admissions.[8] With elective surgery halted, there was ICU bed capacity 
to accommodate the initial increase in ICU referrals
An initial six-bed ‘non-COVID’ ICU managed all such surgical and 
medical patients with overflow into the cardiothoracic ICU. A limited 
cardiothoracic surgery service continued throughout the year but at 
most times we were able to use two to four of the six beds in that unit 
for non-COVID ICU cases.
The situation was dynamic. Weekly consultant meetings were held 
to plan the next phase of the expansion. As the caseload grew, more 
areas were commissioned as ICUs (Figs 1 and 2). The rate of expansion 
depended on a varied demand for beds and the availability of resources 
(Fig. 2). The opening of each new area required intensive negotiations 
on reallocation of existing users of the area and the redeployment of 
medical and nursing staff (Fig.  3). The multi-disciplinary background 
of our consultants enabled ‘boundary-spanning’ negotiations between 
departments when ‘top-down’ edicts failed. 
The clinical technologists took the lead commissioning new ICU areas. 
Equipment and disposable accessories were borrowed, repurposed or 
acquired on emergency purchase orders which were prioritised by the 
hospital finance department. Equipment and pharmaceutical companies 
were most supportive. Equipment to the value of ZAR3.3  million was 
donated by the SA Medical and Educational Foundation. The technologists 
worked tirelessly to clean and check ventilators and gave online tutorials to 
registrars and new ICU nurses on use and care of equipment.
The availability of ICU experienced professional nurses (PN) was 
the greatest limiting factor in expanding the ICU service. Nursing 
ratios were reduced from a usual PN to patient ratio of 1:2 to 1:3 with 
support from enrolled nurses and enrolled nursing auxiliaries. Nurses 
worked 12-hour shifts (including a one-hour break). This required ~28 
nurses for each new 6-bed area. Additional nurses were drafted from the 
closed transplant unit, general wards, theatre recovery and out-patient 
department. The 33% cap on overtime hours was removed. However, 
the use of agency staff reduced as several of the usual ICU-experienced 
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agency staff were lost to the field hospitals. Senior nursing managers 
maintained a high level of visibility in the units and participated 
in patient care. Unit nursing managers and the critical care clinical 
facilitator provided continuous in-service training. 
The ICU medical staff were organised into ‘firms’ each managing 12 to 
18 beds. At the peak of the first wave, we had three ‘COVID ICU’ firms 
and one ‘non-COVID ICU’ firm operating. When possible, at least one 
senior and one junior consultant attended the twice daily ward rounds. 
1st peak 11/6/20 2nd peak 13/1/21
April        May                      June                    July                   Aug                       Sept              Oct                 Nov                       Dec                 Jan                 Feb                  March             April








2020                 2021
Weeks
Fig. 1. Weekly COVID-19 admissions to ICU. Note the rapid rise in admissions before the peaks.
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Fig. 2. Weekly COVID-19 beds in use. After the first 7 admissions, occupancy was close to 100%. Note the prolonged bed requirements following the peaks because 
of prolonged ICU stays.
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The consultants were on call for a week at a time and were responsible 
for making all clinical decisions and approving all admissions. During 
peak admission periods, the consultant taking referrals for admission 
triage rotated daily. They also frequently came in at night to manage 
clinical crises and assist junior staff. 
An additional pulmonologist, neurosurgical intensivist, and 
anaesthesiologist, plus ~18 additional registrars were seconded to us 
from anaesthesia and surgery. They were organised into teams of six per 
firm, working shifts, with two on call during the day and one on night 
call. Weekends and public holidays were treated as normal workdays. 
Adequate time off-duty helped them cope with demanding calls. The 
multi-disciplinary background and seniority of some of the registrars 
made for strong, competent teams. Our teaching programme for 
registrars continued at the bedside and via on-line platforms. Two closed 
WhatsApp groups were used to manage medical staff logistics and were 
invaluable in keeping everyone informed and responding promptly to 
evolving problems.
Staff protection
The first few patients were managed in the 7-bed source isolation 
unit, which has single-bed negative pressure rooms. Once this was 
full, patients were cohorted in open 6-bed ICUs. Personal protective 
equipment in the ICU was as per WHO guidelines. Surgical masks 
were normally worn. Visors and N95 masks were worn for aerosol-
generating procedures. Our internal investigations revealed that all 
the KN95 brands available did not meet required safety standards to 
protect healthcare workers.[9] Doctors often recycled N95 masks over 5 
to 7 days. Reusable elastomeric respirators with replaceable filters were 
supplied but restricted communication to the extent that they were 
impractical. Clean, short-sleeved gowns were donned over personal 
clothes or scrub suits on entering the ICU and discarded on exiting 
followed by hand sanitising. Each bed area was surrounded by a ‘virtual 
cubicle’ marked on the floor. Hand sanitisation was applied, and plastic 
apron and gloves donned before entering the cubicle according to our 
normal practice, with doffing a more formal process to avoid self-
contamination. Caps and foot covers were not used. All ventilators had 
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters attached to their expiratory 
ports and active humidification was used. Ventilator disconnections and 
endotracheal tube cuff deflation were avoided as much as possible. All 
patient documentation was kept outside the virtual cubicle. Patients who 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 after admission to the non-COVID ICU 
were transferred to a COVID ICU as soon as practically possible.
Older staff members and those with comorbidities were designated to 
work in the non-COVID ICU. During the first wave, none of the ICU 
medical staff or intubation team contracted COVID-19, but seven (five 
from COVID ICUs) out of 219 ICU nurses were infected. During the 
second wave, 22 nurses (seven from COVID ICUs), two consultants and 
two registrars were infected. No clear instance of workplace exposure 
was identified. The technologists had a higher infection rate (n=5/8) 
and may have become contaminated while removing and cleaning 
respiratory equipment. Fortunately, none of the ICU staff became 
seriously ill.
Staff and family support 
It is likely that all staff members suffered emotional stress owing 
to the extraordinarily high mortality of our patients, and concerns 
for their own  and their families’ safety. Burnout may have been a 
factor contributing to the reduced availability of nursing staff during 
the second  wave. Caring for colleagues admitted with COVID-19 
pneumonia was particularly stressful. Discussing the decision to 
intubate with patients, telephonically discussing end-of-life decisions 
with families, and conveying bad news were also emotionally taxing. 
Weekly debriefing meetings for the doctors by a consultant psychiatrist 
and clinical psychologist were organised. Initially, these were virtual 
Fig. 3. Geographical expansion of ICU beds. Relocation of units to make space for COVID-19 patients. (Source Iso = source isolation unit; NS = neurosurgical; 
PAHCU = post-anaesthesia high care unit; CTS = cardiothoracic surgery; Surg = surgical; Med = medical; Cardiol = cardiology, TC = trauma centre; 
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meetings, but later changed to smaller face-to-face groups. These 
sessions were most effective when the group was confined to people 
from the same peer-group, as has been suggested elsewhere.[10] Some 
consultants reported that making the decision to refuse ICU admission 
was the worst part of the whole experience. Several registrars reported 
feeling overwhelmed when left alone at night with complex and dying 
patients. Counsellors facilitated small-group sessions for the nurses on 
duty and telephonic one-to-one counselling was available to all staff. 
Small gift packages provided to the nurses by the hospital and charities 
were appreciated. Informal support from a strong team spirit, banter on 
the chat groups and discussions during coffee breaks were very helpful.
Three mobile phones were donated by a charity to make video 
calls to patients’ family members. The palliative care unit assisted 
with supporting some families and held a virtual tutorial on making 
telephonic calls to families and breaking bad news. A maximum of two 
family members were allowed to visit dying patients.
Hospital oxygen supplies
The high number of HFNO machines and ventilators in use resulted 
in an oxygen supply problem. During the first wave, decreases in the 
oxygen pipeline pressures resulted in low-pressure error messages on 
some ventilators, but did not affect patient care. The delivery pressure of 
oxygen from the hospital’s vacuum-insulated evaporator was increased 
and had to be closely monitored. Additional oxygen storage capacity was 
purchased after the end of the first wave. During the second wave, GSH 
was using 11 to 15 tons of liquid oxygen per day, compared to a normal 
consumption of 1 ton per day. The Western Cape was predicted to run 
out of oxygen, but this was managed by halting the supply of oxygen to 
industry and importing oxygen from other provinces. Tanker deliveries 
of oxygen to the hospital had to be made daily at peak periods. 
The second wave
The second wave started with several disadvantages. Western Cape 
suffered the highest peak incidence of cases of all the provinces 
(n=322.9/100 000), almost three times higher than the first wave.[11] The 
number of referrals to ICU was overwhelming. There was no preceding 
curfew or alcohol restriction and elective surgery had recommenced, so 
a greater proportion of available ICU beds accommodated non-COVID 
patients. The increased pressure to maintain urgent and emergency 
surgical services meant that the departments of surgery and anaesthesia 
were not able to release additional registrars early in the second wave 
to support ICU, and the intubation team could not be reconstituted. 
As the second wave expanded first in the private sector, there were less 
agency nurses available, as private hospitals required more nurses for 
their burgeoning ICUs. 
Clinical management
Ward care
COVID-19-positive patients were cohorted in repurposed designated 
medical wards and treated with oxygen via facemask, awake self-
proning, oral prednisolone, thromboprophylaxis and blood glucose 
control.[12] Patients were referred to ICU if a composite assessment of 
respiratory effort, patient exhaustion, rising arterial partial pressure of 
carbon dioxide (PaCO2) or altered mental state suggested HFNO failure, 
and if they met the ICU triage guidelines. Awake prone positioning was 
encouraged at every clinical encounter and reinforced by nursing staff 
according to clinical protocol. Most admissions to the COVID ICUs 
were transferred from the GSH COVID wards.
High-flow nasal oxygen
Initially, support with HFNO was not recommended because of the 
perceived aerosolisation risk.[2] However, the severe shortage of ICU 
beds and a study that suggested that the infection risk was no more than 
the use of an ordinary oxygen mask[13] prompted the use of HFNO. This 
expansion occurred in the wards and an improvement was immediately 
apparent. HFNO avoided the need to intubate some patients without 
requiring a higher level of nurse staffing. Patients were awake, could 
communicate, eat and self-prone. Patients with refractory hypoxia 
despite a high inspired oxygen fraction reservoir mask were trialled 
on HFNO. The decision to initiate HFNO was based on a protocol 
for the stepwise escalation of oxygen therapy and was contraindicated 
in patients with exhaustion or confusion. Additional machines were 
acquired, and HFNO high-care areas were established, facilitated by 
the division of pulmonology, but without any increase in nursing staff. 
Patients wore surgical masks, and all personnel were supplied with 
personal protective equipment including N95 masks and visors. Initially, 
only eight machines were available, but this was increased to 44.
An observational study conducted at GSH and Tygerberg Hospital 
on patients with COVID-19 hypoxia showed that 47% of the patients 
avoided intubation or death despite a mean partial pressure of oxygen to 
inspired oxygen fraction ratio (PaO2/FiO2) of only 76.
[14] 
Triage
One of the most challenging aspects of working in ICU during the 
COVID-19 pandemic was the prioritisation of patients referred to ICU 
for continued management and ventilatory support. 
At the start of the first wave, reports from China, Italy and New 
York showed that hospital systems and ICU capacity were rapidly 
being overwhelmed by COVID-19 patients with severe ARDS. Overall 
mortality for mechanically ventilated patients was high, and survivors 
required prolonged ventilatory support. Reports also suggested that 
elderly patients, those with comorbidities and those with multiple organ 
failures had a higher mortality on mechanical ventilation. An objective 
system to triage was considered essential.
The ICU triage tool included a clear flow diagram and a calculated 
priority score (http://www.sajcc.org.za/public/sup/503.pdf). Scoring was 
based on the clinical frailty scale, the sequential organ failure assessment 
score (SOFA), age, and a comorbidity score. All referrals were assessed 
by the consultant-on-call who made the final admission decision, often 
in consultation with another senior colleague. 
Patients were referred to ICU from within the hospital as well as from 
private hospitals and outlying regional and district level hospitals. The 
Photograph: Hand-print canvas ‘The hands that cared’. 
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widespread distribution of the triage tool greatly assisted in reducing the 
number of unnecessary referrals to ICU.
During the first few months of the pandemic, patients who triaged 
as a category orange (priority 2) or higher were considered for ICU 
admission. As the bed pressure and admission numbers intensified 
during the first wave and second wave, only patients scoring red 1 or red 
2 were considered eligible for ICU admission. Many patients were not 
referred to the ICU if they triaged as red 3, let alone orange or yellow 
priority. Ten red 1 patients, who could not be accommodated, were 
transferred to private hospitals.
Intubation and retrieval
During the first wave, the intubation team was dispatched to the wards 
and emergency unit to intubate accepted patients and transfer them to 
the ICU. This reduced the workload on both ward and ICU staff. Patients 
were only intubated once accepted for intensive care and bed availability 
confirmed, as there were no facilities to keep a ventilated patient waiting 
for an ICU bed. A standardised approach including video laryngoscopy 
was routinely used.[7] Intubation was challenging, and cardiac arrests 
were not infrequent owing to hypoxia and hypotension. After intubation, 
the team transported the patient to the ICU using a portable ventilator 
equipped with a HEPA filter. During the first wave, the team intubated 
and transferred 248 patients to ICU. During the second wave, anaesthesia 
provided intubation skills training to medical staff in the COVID wards.
Medical management in ICU
All patients were ventilated using lung-protective strategies as far as 
possible. Patients were proned at least 16 hours per day when indicated. 
Deep sedation was maintained with propofol and morphine infusions, 
and muscle relaxation using a cisatracurium infusion. This was to prevent 
self- and ventilator-induced lung injury, and accidental disconnections 
and extubations. Physiotherapy was initially not available because of a 
perceived risk to staff but a limited service was introduced later in the 
year and was mainly of value in the rehabilitation phase.
Most patients received some form of corticosteroid. Dexamethasone 
8 mg daily was administered routinely after the benefit was shown in the 
RECOVERY trial.[15] For thromboprophylaxis, subcutaneous enoxaparin 
40 mg was administered daily. If the D-dimer level was elevated, then 
full anticoagulation was considered if the bleeding risk was assessed 
to be acceptably low. Pantoprazole (until feeding was established), 
paracetamol and laxatives were routinely prescribed.
Initially, the dieticians provided telephonic advice on the enteral feed 
formula and dietary supplements. Later, dieticians and pharmacists 
joined the ICU ward round. Vitamins C and D, zinc and thiamine were 
prescribed for most patients. Antibiotics were only administered if a 
co-infection was suspected. 
Secondary infections, including fungal sepsis, were common despite 
stringent infection prevention measures. The clinical course was often 
prolonged and fluctuant. Access to renal support was severely limited by 
the number of dialysis machines, but even when available, the outcome 
of patients who received it was poor. The onset of multiple organ failure 
was often an indication to begin end-of-life discussions with the family 
and most deaths followed a decision to palliate.
Tracheostomy was performed after at least 14 days of intubation 
and once the inspired oxygen concentration had decreased below 
60%. Unlike our usual practice of ICU percutaneous tracheostomy, the 
procedure was preferentially performed in a COVID-designated theatre 
by the otorhinolaryngologists because of the need for diathermy owing 
to anticoagulation. Survivors had a prolonged stay in ICU and required 
considerable physiotherapy for rehabilitation. Every transfer to the ward 
was celebrated by the staff and all but five discharges from ICU were 
discharged from the hospital alive.
Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation
Our unit has an extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) service, 
and this was available for selected patients failing conventional ventilator 
management including proning. The challenges in providing this service 
related to the need for an ECMO-trained PN to be at the bedside at all 
times. Six COVID-19 patients failing mechanical ventilation, who had 
no other organ failure and were thought to have an otherwise good 
prognosis, received veno-venous ECMO. Three of these survived - a rate 
(though numbers were small) equivalent to the international experience 
in this selected group.[16]
Clinical outcomes
Between 5 April 2020 and 18 April 2021, the COVID ICUs admitted 
461 patients. The median age was 50 (range 16 - 77) years and 50.5% 
were female. The median length of ICU stay was 9 days. The median 
P/F ratio on day one after being established on the ventilator was 104.5. 
Forty-four patients had other conditions necessitating admission to ICU 
and a coincidental SARS-CoV-2 infection. As of 28 April 2021, 35% 
(n=161) of patients survived to hospital discharge, and 4 were still in 
ICU. The incidental COVID-19 had a survival rate of 55%. A detailed 
analysis of the outcomes of the COVID-19 ARDS patients will be 
reported in a separate article.
Discussion
Our unit managed a significant response to the pandemic, more than 
doubling the number of ICU beds when required. This was only possible 
because of good leadership, teamwork, effective communication and a 
‘whole hospital’ response. The main limiting factor on our expansion 
was the availability of nurses. This is not a factor that can be rapidly 
remedied and needs to be addressed at a national level.
The organisational response of intensive care services was effective at 
saving the lives of many patients who failed conventional ward therapy 
including HFNO. Our mortality was higher than the 42% mortality 
shown in a recent meta-analysis of ICU outcomes.[17] However, ICU 
mortality is very dependent on admission criteria. In a study of African 
ICUs, we reported an ICU/high care mortality of 48.2%, but a mechanical 
ventilation mortality of 78.9%.[18] By mainly accepting patients who had 
failed HFNO, we selected for a group with a poor prognosis but no 
other option for survival. It is also possible that persisting with HFNO 
worsened pulmonary damage owing to patient-induced lung injury and 
prolonged exposure to high inspired oxygen concentrations. Almost half 
the HFNO patients, who by conventional criteria required immediate 
intubation,[14] survived without intubation HFNO, this intervention 
reducing the need for ICU admission. The reprioritising of hospital 
service to enable our response undoubtedly compromised the care of 
non-COVID patients and exposed limitations in the data available for 
informing the allocation of scarce healthcare resources.
As we approach a third wave, we are determined to apply the lessons 
we have learned. An expansion plan has been drawn up with defined 
triggers for reopening ICU areas proactively. Our staff are vaccinated, 
and we will continue to strive for excellence in patient care.
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Conclusions
Pre-planning, adaptability, leadership, teamwork, and good 
communication are essential in the ICU response to the COVID-19 
surge and to cope with widely fluctuating longitudinal service demands. 
The availability of trained nurses was the main factor limiting ICU 
expansion. An objective triage tool ensured appropriate ICU referrals. 
The use of ward-based HFNO for patients who failed conventional 
oxygen therapy may have reduced the demand for ICU beds. An 
intubation and retrieval team were an effective intervention that 
increased safety for patients and staff. While the survival rate of 
ventilated COVID-19 pneumonia was poor, the ICU service provided 
many desperately ill patients a meaningful chance of survival. 
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